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The Importance of Conducting Thorough
Investigations of Confidential Witnesses in
Securities Fraud Litigation
Leigh Handelman Smollar*
This Article examines the use of confidential witnesses (“CWs”) in
investigating and substantiating securities fraud claims. The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act has placed a heavy burden on plaintiffs
at the pleading stage, which has caused plaintiffs to perform
preliminary investigations and seek confidential information as a basis
for their allegations in the complaint. Testimony of CWs is often the
centerpiece of the evidence substantiating plaintiffs’ securities fraud
claims. As a result, the investigation conducted prior to filing an
amended complaint has become a central issue in the realm of
securities litigation, subject to attack by the defendants.
This Article discusses the legal and ethical considerations for
contacting former employees of the defendants who may become
“confidential informants” that provide invaluable information for
substantiating securities fraud claims. The Article further discusses
defendants’ tactics in attacking the method of plaintiffs and their
counsel’s investigation, subjecting both lead plaintiff and lead counsel
to motions for sanctions for alleged Rule 11 violations pertaining to the

* Leigh Handelman Smollar is a partner at Pomerantz LLP, specializing in securities fraud
litigation. She is a 1993 graduate of the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, where she
graduated from the School of Commerce with high honors, and a 1996 graduate of the ChicagoKent College of Law. Ms. Smollar is admitted to practice in Illinois, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits.
As a member of Pomerantz’ Securities Litigation Group, Ms. Smollar plays a key role in
litigating class actions against public companies for securities fraud. See Bartelt v. Affymax, Inc.,
3:13-cv-01025-WHO ($6.5 million settlement approved in 2014); N.M. State Investment Council
v. Countrywide Fin. Corp. (very favorable confidential settlement on behalf of three large public
funds approved in 2011); In re Sealed Air Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 03-CV-4372 (D.N.J.) ($20
million settlement approved December 2009); In re Safety-Kleen Stockholders Sec. Litig., 3:00736-17 (D.S.C.) (as Co-Lead Counsel, Firm obtained a $54.5 million settlement approved in
2004). Ms. Smollar has also been a panelist on various speaking engagements and has published
several articles and updates related to securities fraud.
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parties’ representations in court. The Article provides advice on
defending these motions and conducting thorough investigations prior
to filing an amended complaint.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses the role that Confidential Witnesses (“CWs”)
play in securities fraud litigation, and advises on how to conduct an
internal investigation related to CW testimony to withstand defendants’
common practice to file motions attempting to throw out the testimony,
or even the claims.1 Often times, attorneys hire investigators to find
former employees of the targeted defendant’s corporation who will talk
about issues related to the alleged fraud. Investigators tend to interview
these witnesses telephonically, taking notes contemporaneously with the
interview.2 The investigators then transpose their interview notes into
memoranda for the plaintiffs’ attorneys to review and assess the
potential testimony.3
1. This Article addresses issues raised in the 2013 Institute for Investor Protection conference
held at Loyola University School of Law, wherein Judge Jed Rakoff was a panelist.
2. See City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin, 952 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting the plaintiff’s attorney’s reliance on notes taken during a telephone
conversation).
3. See In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1311 (S.D. Fla.
2011), aff’d sub nom. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 503 F. App’x 677 (11th Cir. 2012)
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These CWs often do not wish to be embroiled in any kind of
litigation or to talk to lawyers, especially when the discussion revolves
around the alleged fraud committed by their former employer while he
or she was employed there. This Article discusses the reality of
documenting the CW’s potential testimony, which typically forms the
basis of an amended complaint.
Often, after the defendants’ counsel has spoken with a CW, the CW
is concerned about getting involved and will recant his or her
testimony.4 Defendants as of late have been luring CWs into recanting
their testimony, and then threatening to file a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 (“Rule 11”) motion against plaintiffs and their counsel for
filing a complaint without a reasonable basis.5 Further, defendants can
seek sanctions from courts for Rule 11 violations.6
This Article discusses how to conduct an ethical and thorough
investigation to substantiate plaintiffs’ claims for violations of securities
laws, and how to prevent defendants’ counsel from alleging Rule 11
violations against plaintiffs and their counsel when a witness decides to
recant his or her testimony. This Article also discusses how plaintiffs’
attorneys can fight a Rule 11 motion when they know that they
conducted a thorough and ethical investigation despite a witness’
recantation.
I. THE USE OF CONFIDENTIAL WITNESSES
In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act (“PSLRA”) to eliminate abusive practices in federal securities
litigation.7 Among other things, the PSLRA set forth requirements that
(stating that it was not unreasonable for the plaintiff’s attorney to rely on notes taken from
interviews conducted by investigators).
4. Gideon Mark, Recanting Confidential Witnesses in Securities Litigation, 45 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 575, 601 (2014).
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) provides, in relevant part:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party
certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for
any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials
of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are
reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.
6. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (providing a sanction mechanism).
7. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995)

SMOLLAR PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

506

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

3/29/2015 2:03 PM

[Vol. 46

raised the plaintiffs’ burden in pleading federal securities fraud claims.
First, the PSLRA heightened the standard to plead scienter to establish
securities fraud claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
requiring a federal securities fraud complaint to plead facts “giving rise
to a strong inference that the defendants acted with the required state of
mind.”8 Second, the PSLRA instituted an automatic discovery stay
until the resolution of the defendant’s motion to dismiss.9 As a result, a
federal securities plaintiff must, at the outset, plead facts giving rise to a
strong inference of scienter without the benefit of formal discovery.10
In many cases, plaintiffs attempt to meet this burden by relying on
statements attributed to former company insiders, usually referred to as
CWs.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys often employ the use of an investigator to find
former employees that held positions at the defendant company such
that they may have information about the fraud alleged. Some former
employees will agree to discuss their knowledge with investigators
while others will not talk to anyone at all. Many of these former
employees would like their identities to be kept confidential for a
variety of reasons. First, many are still employed in the same line of
business or are looking for a job in that field and are concerned that they
will gain a reputation as a “whistleblower” if their name gets out.
Others simply do not wish to be embroiled in any type of litigation,
especially where their former employer is alleged to have committed
fraud.
Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of New York, a leading
jurist in securities litigation, has stated that the use of CWs has become
an “unintended consequence” of the PSLRA, becoming a problem not
only for plaintiffs, but also for defendants and the court itself.11 There
are problems with witness recantation as well as witness reliability. In
City of Pontiac General Employees’ Retirement System v. Lockheed
Martin, Judge Rakoff denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, partly
based on “reliance on the statements attributable to the [confidential
witnesses].”12 Subsequent to the denial, defense counsel filed a motion
for summary judgment, alleging that the witnesses had recanted their

(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2012).
9. Id.
10. Id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
11. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin, 952 F. Supp. 2d 633, 635
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
12. Id. at 636.
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testimony or denied having made the statements attributed to them.13
The plaintiffs responded that their investigators’ notes confirmed the
allegations in the amended complaint pertaining to those witnesses;
however, the witnesses later changed their stories because of pressure
from defendants.14 Because of these contradicting statements amongst
the parties, Judge Rakoff ordered that the witnesses and the
investigators appear in court for a hearing.15
After the in-court hearing, Judge Rakoff denied summary judgment,
stating that his opinion would follow.16 However, the parties settled the
case that day, therefore Judge Rakoff had no reason to issue a full
opinion on summary judgment.17 Nevertheless, he issued a postsettlement memorandum because, as he noted, “a few comments may be
helpful in light of certain issues presented by [the summary judgment]
motion that are likely to recur in future cases.”18 He further explained
that:
The sole purpose of this memorandum . . . is to focus attention on
the way in which the PSLRA and decisions like Tellabs have led
plaintiffs’ counsel to rely heavily on private inquiries of confidential
witnesses, and the problems this approach tends to generate for both
plaintiffs and defendants. It seems highly unlikely that Congress or
the Supreme Court, in demanding a fair amount of evidentiary detail
in securities class action complaints, intended to turn plaintiffs’
counsel into corporate “private eyes” who would entice naïve or
disgruntled employees into gossip sessions that might help support a
federal lawsuit. Nor did they likely intend to place such employees
in the unenviable position of having to account to their employers
for such indiscretions, whether or not their statements were
accurate. But, as it is, the combined effect of the PSLRA and cases
like Tellabs are likely to make such problems endemic.19

He observed:
[T]he competing pressures this process has placed on the
confidential witnesses and the impact such pressures had had on
their ability to tell the truth. In a nutshell, it appeared to the Court
that some, though not all, of the CWs had been lured by the
investigator into stating as “facts” what were often mere surmises,

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 635.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 638.
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but then, when their indiscretions were revealed, felt pressured into
denying outright statements they had actually made.20

In issuing his Memorandum, Judge Rakoff noted:
In essence, the perhaps-too-easily satisfied “notice pleading”
requirements of a quarter century ago have been replaced, so far as
securities class actions are concerned, by a “demurrer-like” process
that creates considerable hurdles that a plaintiff must overcome
before any discovery is permitted. While designed to give district
courts a “gatekeeper” responsibility to derail dubious class action
lawsuits at the outset, an unintended consequence has been to cause
plaintiffs’ counsel to undertake surreptitious pre-pleading
investigations designed to obtain “dirt” from dissatisfied corporate
employees. Thus in this case, as in many others, the Amended
Complaint relied heavily, although not exclusively, on information
attributed to “confidential witnesses” (“CWs”).21

The same lead counsel from City of Pontiac was sanctioned by a
Northern District of Illinois Court for misrepresenting a CW’s
knowledge of the issues at hand when the lead counsel should have
known that the CW was not employed by the company at the time of the
fraud; where the plaintiff’s counsel’s investigator doubted the veracity
of the CW’s statements; and where the plaintiff’s counsel continued to
argue against dismissal even after the CW told the plaintiff’s counsel he
refused to cooperate, and recanted his prior statements.22 Chief Judge
Ruben Castillo held:
Counsel failed to conduct a proper investigation before filing the
original complaint; counsel blindly relied on their investigators and
failed to verify the truth of the confidential source’s allegations before
including them in the second amended complaint; and counsel made
repeated misrepresentations to the court as to the strength and truth of
the confidential source’s allegations.23

Because of the hurdles plaintiffs must overcome to establish scienter
in securities fraud cases, and because different circuits treat the use of
CWs differently, the use of CWs will continue to be a central issue in
securities litigation. It is therefore important that plaintiffs’ counsel
conduct reliable investigations and corroborate CW statements with
other evidence from the case.
Subsequent to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor

20. Id. at 636–637.
21. Id. at 635.
22. City of Livonia Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co., No. 09 C 7143, 2014 WL 4199136, at *7
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2014).
23. Id. at *4.
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Issues & Rights, Ltd. (“Tellabs II”),24 in construing the “strong
inference” language of the PSLRA, the Seventh Circuit has given mixed
opinions addressing the viability of pleading evidence through CWs to
establish scienter. For example, the Seventh Circuit in Higginbotham v.
Baxter International Inc.,25 found that allegations based on confidential
informants should be heavily discounted.26
However, two months later, in Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs
Inc. (“Tellabs III”),27 the court did not require that CWs ipso facto
require a heavy discount.28 Judge Posner, who was a member of the
panel in Higginbotham, wrote the decision in Tellabs III in which the
circuit court stated that the issue of anonymous informants “led [it] to
suggest in [Higginbotham] that such allegations must be steeply
discounted. But that was a very different case from this one.”29 While
the Seventh Circuit in Tellabs III did not revisit the standard it created
in Higginbotham, it explained that the particular circumstances in
Higginbotham warranted a discounting of the CW testimony,
evidencing the court’s approach in performing a fact-specific inquiry for
each case.30 The Seventh Circuit in Tellabs III held that the facts in
Higginbotham were distinguishable and upheld the complaint, stating
that the “confidential sources listed in the complaint in this case, in
contrast, are numerous and consist of persons who from the description
of their jobs were in a position to know at first hand the facts to which
they are prepared to testify” and “the absence of proper names does not
invalidate the drawing of a strong inference from informants’
assertions.”31
The main difference between Higginbotham and Tellabs III is that in
Higginbotham the plaintiffs did not have any other corroborating
evidence to support scienter, and they were attempting to hold
defendant Baxter International liable for the fraudulent acts of its
foreign subsidiaries.32 In Tellabs III, the plaintiffs had other supporting
evidence corroborating scienter.33 In other words, the other evidence in
the case gleaned through the plaintiffs’ investigation was consistent

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

551 U.S. 308 (2007).
495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id.
513 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 711–12.
Id. at 711.
Id. at 711–12.
Id. at 712.
Id. at 711–12.
Id.
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with the allegations pertaining to the CWs.
It appears that most courts, including the Second, Third, Fifth and
Ninth Circuits, have abandoned the “heavily discounted” language of
Higginbotham so long as the allegations pertaining to the CWs are
supported by corroborating evidence and that the CWs held a position
within the company that one could attribute their knowledge of the
issues at hand.34
Judge Rakoff has noted that heightened pleading standards in
securities class actions have left CWs in a tough spot: lured by plaintiffs
lawyers to exaggerate wrongdoing and then pressured by defendants to
recant their testimony.35 As Judge Rakoff stated in a previous Loyola
University Chicago Law Journal publication, “I see no reason why such
statements should be inherently discounted at the pleading stage just
because the informants are unidentified.”36
Defense attorneys have different theories on what can be done to
address these issues with CWs; however, many of these theories are not
practical. For example, some defense attorneys have suggested
requiring plaintiffs’ lawyers to include a sworn declaration from CWs
verifying their allegations in the complaint. Yet, this defeats the
purpose of having “confidential” witnesses. As Judge Rakoff noted,
34. N.J. Carpenters Pension & Annuity Funds v. Biogen IDEC Inc., 537 F.3d 35, 51 (1st Cir.
2008) (declining to discount pursuant to Higginbotham but following Tellabs II instead—noting
difference within circuit); Pension Trust Fund for Operating Eng’r v. Assisted Living Concepts,
Inc., No. 12-CV-884-JPS, 2013 WL 3154116, at *3 n.5 (E.D. Wis. June 21, 2013) (“[T]here is
strength in the number of confidential witnesses, their corroborative aspects, and the specific
descriptions of each of them.” (citing Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc. (Tellabs III),
513 F.3d 702, 711–712 (7th Cir. 2008))); City of Sterling Heights Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v.
Hospira, Inc., No. 11 C 8332, 2013 WL 566805, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2013) (“[T]he Seventh
Circuit clarified that a particularly troubling use of the confidential sources prompted the holding
in Higginbotham. There, the plaintiffs described the witnesses ‘merely as three ex-employees of
Baxter and two consultants’ and sought to rely upon them exclusively to establish scienter.”
(quoting Tellabs III, 513 F.3d at 712)); Ross v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 12 C 276, 2012 WL
5363431, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2012) (““[Courts will] determine whether unnamed witnesses
were ‘in a position to know at first hand the facts to which they are prepared to testify.’” (quoting
Tellabs III, 513 F.3d at 712)); City of Lakeland Emps.’ Pension Plan v. Baxter Int’l Inc., No. 10
C 6016, 2012 WL 607578, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2012) (upholding scienter based on accounts
from CWs as to how individual defendants were informed about the operations and financial state
of company); Mishkin v. Zynex Inc., No. 09-CV-00780-REB-KLM, 2011 WL 1158715, at *6–7
(D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2011) (declining to follow Higginbotham and instead following the Eleventh
Circuit’s approach in Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1240 (11th Cir. 2008)); In re
Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 693 F. Supp. 2d 241, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Higginbotham . . .
was severely limited when that court decided the Tellabs case on remand from the Supreme
Court.”). But see City of Livonia Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co., 711 F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir.
2013) (CWs do require “heavy discount” in certain questionable circumstances).
35. Jed S. Rakoff, Confidential Informants and Securities Class Actions: Mixed Messages and
Motives, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 573–74 (2014).
36. Id. at 573.
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once the identities of CWs are known, they are then “pressured into
denying outright the statements they had actually made.”37 The fear of
retaliation by a defendant company accounts for most witness
recantations. Further, it is not practical to have the CW sign a
declaration because often it is difficult for an investigator to get a
former employee to talk at all, let alone for a second time or to sign
documents. Also, legal documents have a “chilling effect” on these
witnesses.38 For this reason, former employees are much more willing
to talk if the information they provide does not form the basis of a legal
document.
Defense attorneys have also argued that plaintiffs’ lawyers
themselves, as opposed to their investigators, should participate in the
witness interviews. In arguing so, defendants’ counsel attempt to create
a legal standard that does not exist. While this would be a good way to
ensure that the plaintiffs’ allegations are accurate, it is impractical for
many reasons. First, the imposition of a lawyer—as opposed to an
investigator—could have a chilling effect on CW testimony. Also, an
investigator may take days to contact a potential witness to get an
interview. At the time he or she finally gets the potential witness on the
telephone, the lawyer may not be able to talk. Witnesses are busy and
are not going to go out of their way to assist in a securities fraud case.
Investigators must be allowed to talk to these witnesses whenever and
wherever they can—without worrying about the lawyer’s schedule and
who else must participate in the interview (which is most often
accomplished via telephone). There are, however, certain practices that
plaintiffs’ attorneys can engage in with respect to relying on a CW
interviewed by his or her investigator.
II. ETHICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONTACTING
FORMER/CURRENT EMPLOYEES
It is important that the plaintiff’s lawyer familiarize him or herself
with the ethical rules that govern a lawyer’s communication with
defendants’ former employees. Most states have similar ethical rules,
but different jurisdictions interpret these rules differently. Some states
allow contact with former employees regardless of whether or not they
were deemed in the “control group” at the defendant corporation. For
example, Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2—“Communication
With Person Represented by Counsel”—provides that:

37. Id.
38. In this context, a chilling effect is when a witness who would otherwise talk is discouraged
from assisting in the case for fear of getting involved in the legal process.
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In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court
order.39

In Illinois, the leading case that interprets the definition of
“represented” for purposes of Rule 4.2 is Fair Automotive Repair, Inc.
v. Car-X Service Systems, Inc.40 In Fair Automotive, the plaintiff
brought suit against the defendant company for slander and business
interference.41 After the defendant engaged representation, the plaintiff
hired investigators to pose as customers in defendant’s shops to bait
employees into slandering the plaintiff.42 The defendants objected,
claiming first that the investigator effectively was engaging in a
deposition by soliciting testimony from defendants’ employees, and
second that it was improper for the plaintiffs to speak to the defendants’
employees because they were represented by defendants’ counsel.43
The court rejected defendants’ argument, finding that the employees
were not part of the “control group”:
The [Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co.] case held that, with
regard to a corporation, the attorney-client privilege is applicable only
to those employees within the corporation’s “control group,” which is
defined as those top management persons who had the responsibility
of making final decisions and those employees whose advisory roles
to top management are such that a decision would not normally be
made without those persons’ advice or opinion or whose opinions in
fact form the basis of any final decision. Clearly, if the “control
group” were applied here to corporate parties under Rule 7–104, that
rule was not violated by the investigators’ contacts with the employees
at the Car-X shops.44

Other Seventh Circuit cases have similarly followed suit, finding that:
[N]ot all employees are considered to be represented by a company’s
lawyers under Rule 4.2. If the employee is not represented, then the
plaintiff’s attorney would be free to contact that employee. If the
employee is represented, however, under Rule 4.2 the plaintiff’s
attorney would be required to go through the employee’s lawyer (who
is most likely the company’s lawyer) to schedule a deposition or

39. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2013).
40. Fair Auto. Repair, Inc., v. Car-X Serv. Sys., Inc., 471 N.E.2d 554 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)
(discussing Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 1982)).
41. Id. at 557.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 558.
44. Id. at 560.
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otherwise gain information from the employee. Although this
requirement might raise the cost of gathering information from the
employee, we cannot say that such a requirement amounts to a rule or
device that prevents the employee from furnishing information to the
plaintiff’s attorney.45

In particular, the Seventh Circuit clarified the meaning of “represented”
as follows:
In analyzing the scope of Rule 4.2, the district court adopted the threepart test that the ABA set out in its official commentary to the Model
Rules. The district court also relied heavily on a recent decision from
the Northern District of Illinois, in which that court adopted and
explained the ABA test. Under the test set out in the Model Rules and
Orlowski, a defendant’s employee is considered to be represented by
the defendant’s lawyer, and so is covered by the prohibition in Rule
4.2, if the employee meets any one of the following three criteria: (1)
she has “managerial responsibility” in the defendant’s organization,
(2) her acts or omissions can be imputed to the organization for
purposes of civil or criminal liability, or (3) her statements constitute
admissions by the organization.46

Therefore, a former employee’s statements cannot bind a corporation
because his or her statements cannot be imputed to the corporation. Nor
does a former employee have any managerial responsibility. Federal
courts in the Seventh Circuit have reached this same conclusion: “[t]he
possibility that former employees may reveal damaging
information . . . is insufficient to implicate Rule 4.2.”47 “Former
employees are outside the scope of Rule 4.2 because, unlike current
employees, former employees cannot bind the corporation.”48
However, in other states, such as Connecticut, the Professional
Conduct Rule governing communication with defendants is interpreted
much differently. For example, a district court there held that,

45. Weibrecht v. S. Ill. Transfer, Inc., 241 F.3d 875, 880 (7th Cir. 2001).
46. Id. at 881 (citations omitted).
47. Orlowski v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 723, 728 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (citing
Ahern v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., No. 92 C 4074, 1995 WL 680476, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14,
1995)).
48. EEOC v. Univ. of Chi. Med. Ctr., No. 11 C 6379, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53298, at *11
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2012); see Brown v. St. Joseph Cnty., 148 F.R.D. 246, 253–254 (N.D. Ind.
April 12, 1993) (collecting cases, and stating “[t]his court must agree with the majority of courts
which have held that Rule 4.2 and its analogue, DR 7-104(A)(1), have no application to former
employees who no longer have any relationship with a corporation”); accord. Thorn v. Sunstrand
Corp., No. 95 C 50099, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15761, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 1997) (“Neither
Rule 4.2 nor the comment refer to former employees. Courts have, however, agreed that former
employees do not constitute parties ‘represented by another lawyer’ and, therefore, counsel is not
restricted from communicating with an adverse party’s former employees pursuant to Rule 4.”).
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“[S]ome former employees continue to personify the organization even
after they have terminated their employment relationship[,]” such as
“a managerial level employee involved in the underlying transaction,
who is also conferring with the organization’s lawyer in marshal[]ing
the evidence on its behalf.” For “‘[t]his kind of employee [who] is
undoubtedly privy to privileged information, . . . an opposing lawyer
is not entitled to reap a harvest of such information without a valid
waiver by the organization.’”49

State law governs these types of ethical rules, and it is important to
thoroughly research this issue prior to reaching out to former control
persons. Typically with securities litigation, case-specific facts can
make it difficult to determine which state’s law applies. For example,
the witnesses can be in one state while the lawyers are in a separate
state (sometimes with more than one office around the country); the
defendant can be in a completely different state altogether; or the former
control person can contact the lawyer. These facts present interesting
legal issues that need to be researched. The best way to avoid any
ethical violation is to discuss the potential witness list with your
investigator prior to the interviews. It is important to determine
whether under that particular state’s ethical rules, it would be proper to
contact certain potential witnesses.
III. BEST PRACTICES IN CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION
Prior to starting the interview, the investigator should clearly do the
following. The investigator should make clear to the witness that he or
she works for a law firm adverse to the company. The investigator
should then make clear to the witness that the investigator is not his or
her attorney. The investigator should also make clear to the witness that
his or her statements are not confidential.50 If the witness truly never
wants his or her name disclosed, the testimony cannot be used.
Nevertheless, there are ways to persuade the witness to talk. For
example, it is ethical to say to the witness that discovery is a long time
away and that there is a chance that their identity never gets disclosed if
the case settles early. But the investigator can never ensure the witness
that his or her identity will never be disclosed. Finally, the investigator
49. Weber v. Fujifilm Med. Sys., USA, No. 3:10 CV 401(JBA), 2010 WL 2836720, at *2 (D.
Conn. Jul. 19, 2010) (alterations in original) (citing Dubois v. Gradco Sys., Inc., 136 F.R.D. 341,
346 (D. Conn. 1991)).
50. Ultimately, we are going to have to reveal this ‘CW’s name through discovery, and in
particular, as part of the initial disclosures. Because the pleading requirements have become so
particularized, usually the defendant can determine the CW’s identity simply from reviewing the
complaint. While our Rule 26 disclosures may be a huge laundry list of names, it is unlikely the
CW’s identity will be difficult to ascertain.
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should ensure that the witness is not currently employed with the
defendants and that the witness did not sign a confidentiality agreement
upon his or her departure.51
At a minimum, the investigator should review the draft allegations
prior to filing the complaint to ensure that the allegations are consistent
with his or her notes from the witness interview.
In certain jurisdictions, it is legal to tape a telephone conversation
without the consent of all parties. However, the attorney and the
investigator need to be familiar with the eavesdropping statute of each
state before engaging in this practice. For example, in Illinois, it is
illegal to record a private telephone conversation without the consent of
all parties to the conversation, unless it was unreasonable for the parties
to expect privacy.52 On the other hand, New York’s eavesdropping
statute allows the taping of a conversation with consent of only one of
the parties;53 hence, the investigator may tape the conversation.
More often than not; however, the investigator, the witnesses and the
litigation are spread across the country. When this occurs, the federal
court where the case presides will make a choice-of-law decision to
apply one of the state’s eavesdropping statutes. The law in these
circumstances is unclear, and courts make the choice-of-law decision on
a case-by-case basis. Golden Archer Investments, LLC v. Skynet
Financial Systems54 is a good example of this type of analysis. In that
case, a New York federal court applied Illinois state law and found the
tape-recording illegal. The court noted:
Based on the particular facts of this case, the Court is persuaded that
Illinois law governs Defendant’s counterclaim. First, Rucker recorded
the calls with Silverstein knowing that Silverstein was physically
51. If the former employee did sign such an agreement, ask to get a copy of it. Defendants
cannot shield a fraud by invoking such an agreement. See, e.g., Brado v. Vocera Comm., Inc., 14
F. Supp. 3d 1316 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Takiguchi v. MRI Int’l, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-01183-JAD-VCF,
2013 WL 6528507 (D. Nev. Dec. 11, 2013); In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp.
2d 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2002). These cases provide excellent citations to assist in bringing a motion
to limit the scope of a confidentiality agreement to allow these witnesses to discuss matters
alleged in the complaint.
52. Until recently, the Illinois Eavesdropping Act criminalized the audio recording of
conversations in Illinois without the consent of all parties, but the Illinois Supreme Court
concluded that the law was unconstitutional. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1 (amended 2013),
overruled by People v. Clark, 6 N.E.3d 154 (Ill. 2014); People v. Melongo, 6 N.E.3d 120 (Ill.
2014). Governor Pat Quinn signed a new eavesdropping law at the end of 2014 that hinges on
parties’ reasonable expectations of privacy; for a conversation to be private, at least one party to
the conversation must intend for the conversation to be private and the circumstances surrounding
that intention must be reasonably justified. S.B. 1342, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2014).
53. Golden Archer Inv., LLC v. Skynet Fin. Sys., 908 F. Supp. 2d 526, 537–39 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
54. Id.
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present in Illinois. In this regard, Rucker knowingly reached into
Illinois and committed a tort against an individual and corporate entity
in Illinois. Second, the injury caused by the recordings was inflicted
in Illinois, where Defendant is located. Indeed, a court in Illinois has
held that an individual in New York was liable for violating the
Illinois eavesdropping statute by recording conversations without the
consent of all parties even though the conversation was recorded in
New York.
Whether New York courts will always apply the law of states—
such as Illinois—that take a more restrictive approach to the recording
of telephone conversations is an issue of state law that may ultimately
need to be resolved by the New York Court of Appeals. In an era of
global cellular phone access and number portability, it is certainly
conceivable that New York courts will endeavor to protect their
citizens from liability in foreign jurisdictions and eschew the lex loci
rule, particularly where it is difficult for a caller to know with
certainty where a party to the call is located. However, because
Rucker knew that he was recording a telephone conversation with a
party in Illinois, and the injury was sustained in Illinois, the Court is
persuaded that, as compared to New York, Illinois has the greater
“interest in regulating behavior within its borders,” . . . at least with
respect to the specific conduct at issue in this case.55

Prior to taping a witness telephone conversation, it is important that
the attorney and investigator analyze all factual and legal
considerations. The attorney should also discuss with the investigator
this particular witness’ demeanor and likelihood of speaking to a
lawyer, signing an affidavit or declaration, and the witness’ general
ability to withstand a defendants’ attempt to persuade the witness to
change his or her testimony.
If one witness statement or quotation is particularly important to the
allegations, the following steps should be taken only if the investigator
believes that this witness will speak to a lawyer. The lawyer and the
investigator together should speak to the witness a second time to
confirm the accuracy of the witness’ statements. The investigator
should send the witness the proposed allegations in the complaint to
confirm their accuracy. If the witness is willing, the witness should sign
an affidavit attesting to the accuracy of the allegations. If the witness is
unwilling to actually sign an affidavit, the investigator should confirm
with the witness orally or via email that there are no misstatements
contained in the proposed allegations. Finally, the investigator should
sign an affidavit attesting to the accuracy of the witness statements

55. Id. at 539 (internal citations omitted).
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relayed by the CW to the investigator.
If the investigator believes that the witness will refuse to speak to a
lawyer or sign any legal document, the investigator should take the
following steps. If the investigator has an assistant, the investigator
should have the assistant on the follow-up phone interviews with the
witness as a second pair of ears. The investigator should orally review
the statements with the witness to ensure their accuracy. It can be
helpful to tell the witness that the investigator wants to make sure he or
she understood his or her statements correctly. If quoting a witness, the
investigator should get an affidavit from the witness declaring that the
allegations in the complaint accurately reflect what the witness told the
investigator on a certain date (prior to filing the complaint).
Investigators should also analyze the information from the potential
witness to ensure that it coincides with all of the other evidence
gathered in the case. If, for instance, there are ten CWs saying one
thing, and one CW states something opposite that may help the case,
lawyers should be wary of using this information unless there is
corroborating evidence. It is important that a potential witness’
testimony is consistent with the other potential witnesses and the
investigation.
Investigators should finally analyze whether the witness’ desire to
“not get involved” is worth the potential statements that this witness is
making. If a witness is really averse to talking, he or she will be more
likely to recant his or her testimony once the defendants put pressure on
him or her. Because his or her identity will ultimately have to be
disclosed, lawyers need to think about how this witness will perform at
a deposition. If he or she is too tentative during the investigative
process, chances are that he or she will be even more tentative during a
deposition process.
IV. RULE 11 MOTIONS
Even if plaintiffs’ attorneys and their investigators employ the most
thorough practices to ensure the accuracy of their complaints,
defendants will still attempt to abuse the process by threatening and/or
filing Rule 11 motions, which is simply another way of attempting to
dismiss the case without having the court rule on the merits of a
dismissal motion. Defendants usually threaten to file a Rule 11 motion
based on alleged recantations of the CWs, demanding that plaintiffs
withdraw the allegations.
Because the heightened pleading
requirements of the PSLRA require plaintiffs to plead the details of the
CW’s position and ability to know the facts alleged, the defendants
readily determine who that “anonymous” witness is. Once defendants
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reach out to the witness, the witness often feels pressure to change his
or her testimony and the facts alleged in the complaint. Defendants then
will file a Rule 11 motion, claiming that the witness does not believe the
facts attributed to him or her.
Such “recantation” should not be the basis for a Rule 11 motion. For
example, in In re TETRA Technologies, Inc. Securities Litigation,56
defendants filed a Rule 11 motion, contending that several of the
allegations in the amended complaint had no evidentiary support or
factual basis because the plaintiffs had misquoted or misconstrued
statements made by CWs. The court, in denying defendants’ request for
Rule 11 sanctions, set forth the proper Rule 11 inquiry into claims that
are well grounded in fact and law:
The court considers three issues: (1) factual questions regarding the
attorney’s pre-filing inquiry and factual basis of the filing (2) legal
issues of whether the filing is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument, and (3) discretionary issues regarding an appropriate
sanction. Reasonableness is measured on an objective basis.57

A. Reliance on an Investigator Does Not Violate Rule 11
Defendants generally claim that because the plaintiffs’ attorneys
themselves do not usually speak directly to these informants, but rather
have their investigators conduct the witness interviews, that plaintiffs
have no reasonable basis upon which to rely on that interview to form
allegations in a complaint. In essence, defendants attempt to create a
legal standard that does not exist. “The current version of the Rule
requires only that an attorney conduct “an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances” into whether “factual contentions have evidentiary
support.”58
Defendants almost always cite City of Livonia Employees’ Retirement
System v. Boeing Co.59 as a basis for Rule 11 sanctions. However,
defendants around the country have misrepresented the holding in that
case, where the Seventh Circuit declined to impose sanctions (despite
defendants’ general representation that it imposed sanctions), sending
56. In re Tetra Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 4:08-CV-0965, 2009 WL 6325540, at *39–40 (S.D.
Tex. July 9, 2009).
57. Id. at 39 (internal citations omitted).
58. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b), (b)(3); Harding Univ. v. Consulting Servs. Grp., L.P., 48 F. Supp.
2d 765, 769 (N.D. Ill. 1999); see In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d
1299, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 503 F.
App’x 677 (11th Cir. 2012) (recent PSLRA case where the court denied the ‘defendants’ Rule 11
motion, specifically rejecting this argument, finding that reliance on an investigator was
reasonable).
59. 711 F.3d 754, 762 (7th Cir. 2013).
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the case back to the district court for further determination.60 There, the
district court initially denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, upholding
scienter based solely on allegations pertaining to a CW.61
Subsequently, the investigator acknowledged that she could not verify
what the source had told her and had “qualms” based on inconsistencies
between the source’s information and what she otherwise believed to be
true.62 Even where the court found that some allegations related to this
CW were clearly false63 and where the CW denied everything that the
investigator had reported,64 the Seventh Circuit declined to impose
sanctions, noting that an appeals court can only do so in a “clear
case.”65 The district court did ultimately impose sanctions against
Robbins Geller, finding that the lawyers actually made
misrepresentations to the court regarding the CWs.
In City of Livonia, Chief Judge Castillo issued sanctions, finding that:
Plaintiffs’ counsel knew that the information [the CW] provided the
investigator was unverified and potentially unreliable and that [the
CW] refused to cooperate further, and yet repeatedly made assurances
to the court as to the truth of the allegations. The information turned
out to be blatantly false, and if counsel had made any attempt to verify
the information, they would have easily discovered this. Instead, they
blindly defended the allegations their investigator attributed to [the
CW] and made fundamental misrepresentations to the court. Counsel
failed to verify the allegations so as to remain ignorant of the truth,
and this conduct is reckless and unjustified. The Court agrees with the
Seventh Circuit’s characterization of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s conduct as
“ostrich tactics”—counsel put their heads in the sand to avoid
discovering the truth. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’
counsel violated Rule 11(b) by filing its amended complaint and
second amended complaint without conducting a reasonable pre-filing
investigation and by asserting and defending factual contentions that
lacked evidentiary support.66

In City of Livonia, the investigator did not believe the statements
made by the CW based on other evidence that had been gleaned through
the investigation, and the CW was not even a former employee of the
company. The key to avoiding sanctions is to ensure that there is

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 760.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 762.
66. City of Livonia Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co., No. 09 C 7143, 2014 WL 4199136, at *7
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2014).
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corroborating evidence to the CW statements. In other words, ensuring
what the CW is saying is consistent with all other evidence gathered in
the case through investigation and research.
B. Sanctions Are Warranted Only if Allegations Are
“Utterly Lacking” Support After Resolving All
Doubts in Favor of Counsel
“Sanctions may not be imposed unless a particular allegation is
utterly lacking in support.”67 “This standard differs from the pre-1993
amendments. Under the former Rule, a signature on a pleading certified
that the contentions therein were ‘well-grounded in fact.’”68 This is
particularly true in cases like this where discovery is stayed and the bulk
of information required to prove the case is solely within the
defendants’ possession.69
Rule 11 pertains to the parties’ representations in court.70 “Under
Rule 11, an attorney must make some reasonable inquiry into the facts
and the law. The reasonableness of the inquiry is a fact-based question,
dependent on the circumstances of the case at hand.”71 The standard for
determining whether Rule 11 sanctions should be imposed is a high
threshold. The In re BankAtlantic Corp. court clearly sets forth the
standard, finding that the legal and factual claims must be
“objectionably frivolous”:

67. O’Brien v. Alexander, 101 F.3d 1479, 1489 (2d Cir. 1996).
68. Harding Univ. v. Consulting Serv. Grp., 48 F. Supp. 2d 765, 769 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (citing
FED. R. CIV. P. 11).
69. See Henderson v. Jupiter Aluminum Corp., No. 2:05CV81, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7777,
at *21 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 15, 2006) (“[S]everal factors should be examined, including . . . the
attorney’s ability to do a sufficient pre-filing investigation; and whether discovery would have
been beneficial to the development of the underlying facts.”).
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) provides, in relevant part:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party
certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for
any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials
of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are
reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.
71. In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2011)
(citing Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 87 F.3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 1996)), aff’d sub
nom. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 503 F. App’x 677 (11th Cir. 2012).
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A legal claim is frivolous if no reasonably competent attorney could
conclude that it has any reasonable chance of success or is a
reasonable argument to change existing law.
A factual claim is frivolous if no reasonably competent attorney
could conclude that it has a reasonable evidentiary basis, because it is
supported by no evidence or only by “patently frivolous” evidence.
When, however, the evidence supporting a claim is reasonable, but
only weak or self-serving, sanctions cannot be imposed.72

Rule 11 is not a best-practices standard.73 Further, “whether the
confidential witnesses initially made the statements attributed to them in
the complaints is essentially a credibility question. In this context, Rule
11 sanctions are not appropriate.”74
C. Rule 11 Analysis Cannot Be Made In Hindsight
A Rule 11 motion cannot be based on hindsight. The Court must
assess whether plaintiff’s complaint had a reasonable basis based on
what counsel knew “at the time the complaint was filed, not what
subsequently was revealed in discovery.”75 Thus, “Rule 11 does not
allow an award of sanctions just because things went poorly after an
investigation that was adequate in light of what was known (and how
much time was available) before the paper was filed.”76 In addition,
when considering inability to ultimately prove a factual allegation, even
after the benefit of discovery, is not grounds for a Rule 11 sanction.77
Therefore, where a witness recants his or her testimony after the filing
of the amended complaint, Rule 11 sanctions are not appropriate
because the plaintiff’s attorney had a reasonable basis to make those
allegations at the time the complaint was filed. A court must “resolve
all doubts in favor of the signer.”78
D. Rule 11 Motions Based on CW Testimony Should Be
Denied as Premature
A court is required sua sponte to review the pleadings after final

72. Id. at 1308 (internal citations omitted).
73. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983).
74. In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d at 1312.
75. Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., 388 F.3d 990, 1014 (7th Cir. 2004).
76. LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Cnty. of DuPage, No. 82C6517, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7748, at
*6–7 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 1992) (denying Rule 11 motion), aff’d, 10 F.3d 1333 (7th Cir. 1993).
77. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583, 586 (1993)
(“The certification is that there is (or likely will be) ‘evidentiary support’ for the allegation, not
that the party will prevail with respect to its contention regarding the fact.”).
78. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir. 1968).
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adjudication of a case to determine whether sanctions are warranted.79
The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1983 amendments to Rule 11—
and the case law—also make clear that the issue of sanctions in the case
of pleadings “normally will be determined at the end of the litigation.”80
Generally, defendants seek a Rule 11 determination before the
plaintiffs have obtained any discovery, before producing a single
document, and without having offered a single witness for deposition.81
At a minimum, until discovery has been completed, a court simply
cannot find that “no reasonable evidentiary basis for a factual claim was
disclosed in pretrial proceedings or at trial”—the prerequisite for any
examination of plaintiffs’ pre-filing inquiry.82 Therefore, a Rule 11
motion filed during the stay of discovery, and while a motion to dismiss
is pending, is premature and should be denied.
E. Defending a Rule 11 Motion
If defendants threaten to file a Rule 11 motion, claiming that a
particular CW has either recanted or claims not to have said what the
allegations attribute to that CW, the first step counsel should take is to
contact the investigator to confirm that the allegations accurately depict
what the CW told counsel’s investigator. If counsel is confident that he
or she properly quoted the CW or summarized accurately what the CW
said to the investigator, counsel should vigorously defend the Rule 11
motion. The best way to defend the motion is to reach out to the CW
again and confirm that the complaint properly reflects what the CW
said. However, practically speaking, the CW may waiver on the facts
because the defendants have most likely already succeeded in getting
the CW to re-think his or her testimony.
Solutions to defending a Rule 11 motion include the following. The
plaintiff’s attorney can file an affidavit from the CW attesting that the
allegations in the complaint accurately reflect what the CW told the
investigator. If the CW takes issue with the way the attorney worded
the allegations, the plaintiff’s attorney should file an affidavit from the
CW declaring that the complaint accurately states what the CW told the
79. 5 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1) (2012).
80. See Jawbone, L.L.C. v. Donohue, No. 01 Civ. 8066(CSH), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11806,
at *19 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2002) (refusing to find, “at [an] early stage of the litigation, without the
benefit of discovery and a thorough analysis of the merits of the case, that plaintiff’s factual
allegations are completely without support”).
81. For two examples in which the defendant moved for sanctions prior to discovery, see Katz
v. Household Int’l, Inc., 36 F.3d 670 (7th Cir 1994), and Zambrano v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers Local 1202, No. 89 C 6109, 1992 WL 44403 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 1992).
82. Calloway v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 854 F.2d 1452, 1470 (2d Cir. 1988), rev’d in part on
other grounds sub nom. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120 (1989).
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investigator, but that the CW did not mean it in that context.
If the CW refuses to sign anything, the lawyer or investigator should
at least orally confirm that there are no misstatements in the complaint.
Then, the investigator can sign an affidavit stating that: the allegations
properly reflect what the CW told the investigator prior to filing the
complaint; that interview notes were drafted contemporaneously with
each witness; that a detailed memorandum of the interview was drafted
shortly thereafter; that the interview notes and memoranda accurately
reflect the allegations pertaining to the CW; and that the investigator has
spoken with the CW after the filing of the Rule 11 motion and agrees
that there are no inaccuracies in the complaint attributed to that CW. If
plaintiff’s counsel believes that defense counsel have filed a Rule 11
motion simply to harass lead plaintiff and/or lead counsel, plaintiff’s
counsel can do more than just defend against the Rule 11 motion:
counsel can and should file a cross-motion for sanctions. There are a
few different legal avenues plaintiff’s counsel can undertake to have a
court review a cross-motion in a timely manner.
F. Consider Filing a Cross-Motion for Sanctions
It is well established that “the filing of a motion for sanctions is itself
subject to the requirements of the rule and can lead to sanctions.”83
Many times, the only purpose of a Rule 11 motion in this context is
to intimidate lead counsel and his or her clients into dismissing a viable
securities fraud action. In situations where counsel can show that the
motion was filed for an improper purpose, counsel should consider
moving for cross-sanctions.84
83. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583, 591 (1993);
see Meeks v. Jewel Cos., 845 F.2d 1421, 1422 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding defendant’s request for
sanctions frivolous); In re Cent. Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1070 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding the
request for sanctions as “sanctionably frivolous”); see Local 106, Serv. Emps.’ Int’l Union v.
Homewood Mem’l Gardens, Inc., 838 F.2d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding unwarranted motion
for Rule 11 sanctions is itself sanctionable); Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 484–85 (3d
Cir. 1987) (stating that courts may impose sanctions when Rule 11 is invoked for improper
purpose, such as additional tactic of intimidation and harassment); Lewandowski v. Two Rivers
Pub. Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 1486, 1499 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (finding that “defendants should have
conducted a reasonable inquiry into the law bearing on their own position” prior to filing a Rule
11 motion); Quaker Oats Co. v. Uni-Pak Film Sys., 683 F. Supp. 1186, 1189 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(stating that if Rule 11 motion is not warranted by existing law and fact, appropriate sanctions
may be assessed, warning that “counsel would do well to choose their Rule 11 battles with more
care”).
84. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1) (describing “improper purposes” as including “to harass,
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation”); FED. R. CIV. P. 11
advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583, 590 (1993) (stating that Rule 11 should
not be used “to intimidate an adversary into withdrawing contentions that are fairly debatable”).
Pursuant to Rule 11(c)(2):
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Sanctions may also be imposed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which
notes that an attorney “who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy
personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably
incurred because of such conduct.”85 The purpose of § 1927 “is to deter
frivolous litigation and abusive practices by attorneys, and to ensure that
those who create unnecessary costs also bear them.”86 Ultimately,
“when an attorney recklessly creates needless costs the other side is
entitled to relief.”87 Further, unlike Rule 11, sanctions under § 1927 do
not require a hearing.88 Where defendants have recklessly created
needless cost and expense to plaintiffs in responding to defendants’
baseless Rule 11 motions, defendants should bear the costs and
expenses plaintiffs have incurred in responding.
CONCLUSION
When assessing whether to use a CW’s potential testimony,
plaintiffs’ attorneys need to weigh the credibility of the witness against
the benefit of the testimony. If an attorney and his or her investigator
believe that the court will have problems with the CW later in the
litigation, it is probably best not to use the CW’s testimony in the
complaint. Plaintiffs’ attorneys need to make sure to disclose to the CW
that his or her testimony is not confidential. While it is plaintiffs’
attorneys’ job to make inferences from the CW’s testimony, they need
to make sure that those inferences are reasonable in light of the evidence
gathered to date.

“‘[S]ervice of a cross motion under Rule 11 should rarely be needed since under the
revision the court may award to the person who prevails on a motion under Rule 11—
whether the movant or the target of the motion—reasonable expenses, including
attorney’s fees, incurred in presenting or opposing the motion.’”
Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., No. Civ. 00 C 2905, 2003 WL 1956132, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24,
2003) (alteration in original) (quoting advisory committee notes to the Rule 11 1993
amendments). Moreover, “[c]ompliance with the safe harbor provision is not required when a
party merely receives attorneys’ fees and costs for successfully defending against a Motion for
Sanctions.” Id.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012).
86. Kapco Mfg. Co., Inc. v. C & O Enters., Inc., 886 F.2d 1485, 1491 (7th Cir. 1989) (internal
citations omitted).
87. IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Alliance Assoc., Inc., 266 F.3d 645, 654 (7th Cir. 2001)
(quoting In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 1985)).
88. Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1201 (7th Cir. 1987).

